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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
PER CURIAM: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant Mikael Salovaara appeals from the 
District Court's dismissal of the derivative action he 
brought on behalf of several entities, described in more 
detail below, against Defendant-Appellees Jackson National 
Life Insurance company and Lazard Frer es & Co. As 
explained below, we will dismiss Salovaara's appeal with 
regard to Jackson because it is moot and will affirm the 
dismissal order regarding Salovaara's complaint against 
Lazard Freres & Co. 
 
JURISDICTION 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Section 
27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
S 78aa, and under 28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1332, and 1367. The 
parties consented to allow a Magistrate Judge to decide the 
dispositive motion in this case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
73 and 28 U.S.C. S 636. Because the Magistrate Judge 
dismissed Salovaara's Third Amended Complaint, we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 636(c) and 1291. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURES 
 
This appeal arises from the District Court's dismissal of 
a derivative suit, alleging fraud in the sale of certain debt 
securities. The plaintiff-appellant in this case is Mikael 
Salovaara. He brought suit on behalf of himself,2 as well as 
on behalf of the following entities: South Str eet Leveraged 
Corporate Recovery Fund, South Street Corporate Recovery 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The claims that Salovaara brought in his individual capacity have 
since been dismissed. He does not appeal that dismissal. 
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Fund (collectively "the South Street Funds"); SSP Inc.; and 
SSP Partners and SSP Advisors (collectively "the SSP LPs").3 
 
SSP Inc. is the general partner of the SSP LPs. The SSP 
LPs are in turn general partners of the South Street Funds. 
The South Street Funds make investments by buying debt 
securities from various companies. A sale of debt securities 
by the South Street Funds to the Jackson National Life 
Insurance Company ("Jackson" or "JNL") is at issue in this 
case. 
 
Two people are behind the SSP LPs and the South Street 
Funds: Salovaara and Alfred C. Eckert, III. Salovaara and 
Eckert each own 50% of the stock of SSP Inc. Eckert is a 
director of the corporation, while Salovaara is not. 
Salovaara and Eckert also own all the equity in the SSP 
LPs. Salovaara and Eckert used the SSP LPs to make 
investments in the South Street Funds. They cr eated these 
entities in 1991, but have since had a falling out. Salovaara 
was a limited partner of the SSP LPs at the time of the 
transactions at issue, although he is not today. Currently, 
the directors of SSP Inc. are Eckert, Gary Hindes, and 
Denise Hindes. Following a dispute and litigation between 
Salovaara and Eckert over control of the South Street 
Funds, the Hindes were given control over a majority of the 
South Street Funds assets. As a result, the Hindes 
controlled more than 95% of the Notes held by the South 
Street Funds, while Salovaara maintained contr ol over less 
than 5%. 
 
In 1992, before Salovaara and Eckert had their falling 
out, the South Street Funds invested in the debt of 
Bucyrus-Erie International ("Bucyrus"), by securing 
financing for that company. In 1994, Bucyrus filed for relief 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. A r eorganization 
plan for Bucyrus was confirmed in December of 1994. 
Under this plan, the South Street Funds r eceived notes 
issued by Bucyrus (the "Notes") as a r eplacement for the 
debt they had acquired in 1992. The South Str eet Funds 
also received 11% of the stock of the r eorganized company. 
By late 1995, the South Street Funds held Notes issued by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. LP is short for Limited Partnership. 
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Bucyrus with a face value (or "par value") of more than $55 
million. 
 
In late 1995, the Hindes decided to sell the Notes under 
their control, and hired defendant-appellee Lazard Freres & 
Co. ("Lazard") to assist them by pr oviding advice concerning 
the actual market value of the Notes and the 
reasonableness of any offers made to pur chase them.4 
Lazard entered into negotiations on behalf of the South 
Street Funds with the other defendant-appellee in this case, 
the Jackson National Life Insurance Company. On 
February 28, 1996, the Hindes sold the majority shar e of 
the Notes to Jackson, through Lazard, on behalf of the 
South Street Funds. Jackson paid a price of approximately 
94% of the par value of the Notes. Lazard, as the broker, 
received approximately 1% of this value as a commission. 
On February 29, 1996, Salovaara sought to enjoin this sale 
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York. The court denied this relief, and the trade settled on 
March 4, 1996. 
 
Salovaara claims that Jackson engaged in insider trading 
when it bought the Notes, assisted by Lazard. He states 
that Jackson was the "controlling shar eholder" of Bucyrus 
at the time of the transaction, and that it appointed two of 
its nominees to Bucyrus' Board of Directors. He claims that 
as a result of its ties with Bucyrus, Jackson knew in early 
1996 that Bucyrus was considering refinancing the Notes 
at their par value. Jackson further knew that Bucyrus' 
business prospects had improved dramatically, and that it 
was appointing a new and respected head for the company. 
This information was not available to the general public at 
the time. 
 
Salovaara claims that Jackson misappropriated inside 
information from Bucyrus, from which it learned the Notes 
were worth their face value and not 94% of that value. 
Salovaara states that the South Street Funds only 
consented to sell the Notes to Jackson at 94% of their par 
value because it did not realize they wer e actually worth 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Even though the Notes had a par or face value of more than $55 
million, their market value depended upon the likelihood that Bucyrus 
would actually be able to repay this debt. 
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more than that on the market. Salovaara claims that 
Lazard told the Funds that 94% of par value was a fair 
price. Thus, according to Salovaara, Lazar d told the South 
Street Funds that the Notes were worth 94% of par while at 
the same time it advised Bucyrus that they wer e worth 
more. According to Salovaara, Jackson was able, through 
its access to this inside information, to take a "risk free 
profit" by buying these Notes for less than they were worth. 
Lazard received a 1% commission for its part in facilitating 
the sale. Salovaara claims Lazard never told the South 
Street Funds that it was advising Bucyrus at the same time 
that it was advising the Funds, and that it br eached its 
duty to the South Street Funds due to this undisclosed 
conflict of interest. 
 
Salovaara sued Jackson for insider trading, in violation of 
the Securities Exchange Act S 10(b), and SEC Rule 10b-5. 
Jackson and Salovaara disagree over whether Salovaara 
pleaded a claim under the misappropriation theory, or 
whether Salovaara only pleaded a `traditional' claim of 
insider trading. Salovaara's complaint also asserted a state 
common-law claim against Jackson for fraudulent non- 
disclosure of material information. Salovaara sued Lazard 
for breach of contract and breach of itsfiduciary duty to 
the South Street Funds. The District Court, with the 
consent of the parties, turned the case over to a Magistrate 
Judge for resolution. We shall simply r efer to the action of 
the District Court when discussing the prior pr oceedings in 
this matter. 
 
Jackson then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, 
and a motion to transfer the case to the Souther n District 
of New York. The court initially granted the transfer, but the 
Southern District returned the case to the District of New 
Jersey. Jackson then moved that the complaints against it 
should be dismissed because it did not have a duty to 
disclose any information about Bucyrus in its possession to 
the South Street Funds. Jackson similarly ar gued that it 
did not have a duty to speak giving rise to common law 
cause of action, even if Salovaara stated one in his 
complaint. Finally, Jackson argued that Salovaara was not 
the proper party to bring this suit on behalf of the South 
Street Funds, because he did not meet the r equirements set 
forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1. 
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Salovaara replied that if the Notes wer e stocks and not 
bonds, he would clearly have alleged a case of insider 
trading. He argued for extension of pr ecedents regarding 
stocks to cover debt securities such as the bonds in 
question. Salovaara further replied that Jackson did have a 
duty to speak with regard to the common law claim. 
Finally, Salovaara claimed he was a proper party to bring 
this suit because his interests and those of the South 
Street Funds are aligned in this case, even though they are 
engaged in adversarial litigation on other matters. 
 
Lazard responded that Counts II, IV and V of the 
complaint should be dismissed against it because it entered 
into a forum selection clause as part of an Indemnification 
Agreement with the South Street Funds that covers the 
subject matter of this suit. This forum selection clause 
specified that any disputes arising over the sale of the 
Notes must be resolved in the New York State courts 
located in New York County, or the federal courts located in 
the Southern District of New York. Salovaara replied that 
the Indemnification Agreement does not cover the subject 
matter of this suit, and that dismissal or transfer would not 
be appropriate even if it did. According to Salovaara, 
dismissal or transfer are not in the inter ests of judicial 
efficiency and will lead to increased costs for the parties, as 
well as the possibility of inconsistent verdicts in the two 
actions. 
 
The District Court held that Salovaara did not state a 
claim under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act or Rule 10b- 
5, because Jackson did not have a duty to disclose any 
information regarding Bucyrus to the South Street Funds. 
It reasoned that "there can be no fraud absent a duty to 
speak." Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F .3d 1406, 1418 (1993) 
(citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980)). 
It therefore dismissed these claims. It r ejected Salovaara's 
claim that United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) 
expanded the scope of Chiarella to include a duty to 
disclose any nonpublic information prior to a sale of 
securities. The District Court noted that O'Hagan involved 
a breach of duty that is not present in this case. It 
reasoned that a corporation does not have afiduciary 
relationship with its debt security holders as it does with its 
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shareholders, so O'Hagan does not apply. Jackson, the 
District Court held, owed no duty to the South Str eet 
Funds. Alternatively, the District Court held that because 
the South Street Funds were not the sour ce of Jackson's 
information, Jackson had no fiduciary r elationship with the 
Funds that was violated during this sale. 
 
With regard to the common law fraud claim, the District 
Court reasoned that the claim could only stand if Jackson 
had a duty to speak to the South Street Funds as part of 
this transaction. As a matter of law, the District Court held 
that Jackson had no such duty, and it dismissed this claim 
as well. 
 
Finally, the District Court agreed that Salovaara was not 
a proper party to bring this action, because he is in a 
generally adversarial position to the South Str eet Funds in 
other ongoing litigation, he testified in a r elated action that 
he had personal knowledge of the information he claims 
Jackson and Lazard failed to disclose to the South Street 
Funds, and he has engaged in a sham proceeding to 
manufacture evidence in his lawsuit against the Hindes, 
and therefore comes to court with unclean hands. 
 
As to Lazard's motion to enforce the forum selection 
clause, the District Court granted it, treating it as a motion 
to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It found that the 
Indemnification Agreement covered the subject matter of 
the current lawsuit, and that the balancing test required by 
28 U.S.C. S 1404(a) favored dismissal so the action could be 
re-filed in the Southern District of New York. It reasoned 
that it had the power to dismiss the claim against Lazard 
instead of transferring the case, citing National 
Micrographics Sys. v. Canon U.S.A., 825 F . Supp. 671, 679 
(D.N.J. 1993). 
 
Salovaara now appeals all these rulings. Jackson has 
filed a new motion to dismiss the claims against it as moot, 
based on the fact that it has settled any outstanding claims 
between it and the South Street Funds. Salovaara opposes 
this motion, arguing that the case is not moot because we 
have the power to review the propriety of this settlement 
agreement. 
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ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Although we have heard oral argument and reviewed the 
parties' briefs regarding numerous issues, we find the two 
issues that follow are dispositive. Ther efore, we will not 
address the remainder of the issues raised by Salovaara. 
 
I. Is Salovaara's suit against Jackson National moot as 
       a result of the settlement agreement r eached between 
       Jackson National and the South Street Funds? 
 
We exercise plenary review over whether, as a matter of 
law, a case is moot. An appeal is moot when ther e exists no 
"subject matter upon which the judgment of the court can 
operate to make a substantive determination on the 
merits." Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1325- 
26 (3d Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). 
 
II. Did the District Court properly dismiss the claim 
       against Lazard because of the forum selection clause 
       in the Indemnification Agreement? 
 
The interpretation and enforcement of a forum selection 
clause is a matter of law, and we exercise plenary review 
over it. See Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co. , 55 F.3d 873 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
I. Is Salovaara's suit against Jackson National moot as 
       a result of the settlement agreement r eached between 
       Jackson National and the South Street Funds? 
 
The only counts Salovaara currently asserts against 
Jackson were brought in a repr esentative capacity on 
behalf of the South Street Funds. Jackson and the South 
Street Funds have agreed to settle all disputes between 
them, and the South Street Funds have given Jackson a 
general release from any and all liability. Money has 
already been distributed as part of the settlement 
agreement. Jackson has therefore moved to dismiss this 
lawsuit, with the support of the South Street Funds, as 
moot. 
 
The Settlement Agreement and Release wer e signed on 
March 23, 2000. See Cooper Aff.P 9, Ex. C. As part of this 
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Settlement, the South Street Funds has r eceived or will 
soon receive $18 million that has been held in escrow as a 
result of the Bucyrus bankruptcy, and Jackson has 
received or will soon receive $6 million. Jackson argues 
that because all liabilities between it and the South Street 
Funds have thus been resolved, there is no relief we can 
grant and the appeal should be dismissed. 
 
An appeal is moot when there exists no "subject matter 
upon which the judgment of the court can operate to make 
a substantive determination on the merits." Harris v. City of 
Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1325-26 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(quotation omitted). If events occur after the filing of a 
notice of appeal that moot the issues presented, then there 
is no remaining justiciable controversy. W e do not have 
jurisdiction to hear a case that cannot affect the rights the 
appellant wishes to assert. See North Car olina v. Rice, 404 
U.S. 244, 246 (1971). Further, we may consider the 
question of whether a case has become moot, even if this 
issue was not certified for appeal. See Larsen v. Senate of 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 152 F.3d 240, 246 (3d 
Cir. 1998). Intervening events, such as the parties reaching 
settlement in the case, can render an appeal moot. See 
Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F .3d 690, 699 (3d 
Cir. 1996). Moreover, vacatur may be decreed for judgments 
whose review has become moot due to cir cumstances 
beyond the control of any of the parties or where the 
mootness results from the unilateral action of the party 
who prevailed in the lower court. See Kacher v. May, 484 
U.S. 72, 82, 83, 108 S.Ct. 388, 391 (1987); United States v. 
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 40, 71 S.Ct. 104, 107 (1950). 
Because mootness by reason of a settlement is a result of 
the voluntary actions of the party, it does not justify 
vacatur of a federal civil judgment under review. See U.S. 
Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 
29, 115 S.Ct. 386, 393 (1994). 
 
Thus, the only question before us is whether the dispute 
between the South Street Funds and Jackson was properly 
resolved while this derivative suit was pending. A 
corporation may enter into a settlement despite the 
existence of a derivative action when doing so is in the 
corporation's best interests. See W olf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 
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994, 997 (2d Cir. 1965). Jackson points out that the South 
Street Funds voluntarily and knowingly surr endered their 
right to recover damages from this appeal. Further, it points 
out that because none of the South Street Funds' officers or 
directors were named as defendants in this lawsuit, there is 
no reason to suspect an internal conflict of interest led the 
Funds to settle this lawsuit for improper r easons. The 
South Street Funds have noted their support for dismissal 
of this appeal, and they have benefitted fr om the Settlement 
Agreement. The benefits the South Str eet Funds have 
received by settling with Jackson include the r esolution of 
eight separate cases in four courts that have been in 
progress for five years, the limitation of the Funds' potential 
exposure to liability, and the receipt of a recovery of a total 
of $19 million from various proceedings. Jackson maintains 
that it is not in the South Street Funds' best interests to 
continue with this derivative suit, given the benefits it has 
received from the settlement, and the South Street Funds 
agrees with this assessment. 
 
Salovaara responds that this appeal is not moot, because 
we must review the Settlement Agreement to make sure it 
was reached in good faith and was in the best interest of 
the South Street Funds. According to Salovaara, Jackson 
has provided only conclusory statements that the 
Agreement was in the South Street Funds' best interests 
and this is insufficient. Further, he ar gues these statements 
do not demonstrate a lack of collusion between Jackson 
and the South Street Funds. Salovaara ar gues that some of 
the cases settled as part of this agreement wer e frivolous, 
and the Agreement was of little value in this r egard. He also 
suggests that Eckert has a conflict of inter est that prevents 
him from entering into a fair Settlement Agr eement in this 
case. 
 
It is clear from the case law that we do not have to accept 
this Settlement Agreement at face value. W e have the 
equitable power to review the Settlement for r easonableness 
and to enjoin the corporation from entering into it, either 
temporarily or permanently, if it is not in the best interests 
of the company. See Wolf, 348 F .2d at 998; Cramer v. 
General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979). However, our 
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precedents do not require us to hold a special evidentiary 
hearing in every case; they merely demonstrate that we may 
review settlement agreements when derivative suits are 
pending if the circumstances so warrant. 
 
On the present facts, we do not see anything that would 
trigger a need for further scrutiny of the Settlement 
Agreement on our part. The conflict Salovaara attributes to 
Eckert is so tenuous that we do not find it r elevant. 
Moreover, Jackson sets forth specific reasons why the 
Settlement Agreement was in the best inter ests of the 
South Street Funds, and these reasons ar e objectively 
reasonable. Salovaara has not shown the existence of any 
improper collusion or bad faith in reaching this Agreement. 
Moreover, Salovaara may always file a new lawsuit against 
the South Street Funds if he believes it br eached a duty 
towards the shareholders by entering into the Settlement. 
We do not need to re-open the settlement in the present 
case. 
 
We therefore decline to intervene in this Settlement. 
Because there is no relief we can grant the South Street 
Funds beyond that provided in the Settlement Agreement, 
even if we were to decide in Salovaara's favor on the merits 
of this appeal, we will dismiss Salovaara's appeal r egarding 
Jackson as moot. 
 
II. Did the District Court properly dismiss the claim 
       against Lazard because of the forum selection clause 
       in the Indemnification Agreement? 
 
Lazard claims that a forum selection clause covers the 
dispute between it and the South Street Funds, and 
requires that this lawsuit be brought either in the District 
Court for the Southern District of New Y ork or in a New 
York State court located within New Y ork County. In 
reaching its decision to dismiss on this basis, the District 
Court had to interpret the forum selection clause to see 
whether it applied to the subject matter of this dispute. The 
District Court also had to decide on the proper procedure 
for enforcing a forum selection clause. W e will address the 
procedural question first, followed by the question of 
whether the District Court correctly interpr eted the forum 
selection clause. 
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A. The Procedure for Enforcing A Forum Selection 
       Clause 
 
It is clear that a party may bring a motion to transfer 
from the initial federal forum to another federal court based 
on a valid forum selection clause. Such a motion is 
governed by 28 U.S.C. S 1404(a).5 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. 
Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 2245 (1988). 
Transfer is not available, however, when a forum selection 
clause specifies a non-federal forum. In that case, it seems 
the district court would have no choice but to dismiss the 
action so it can be filed in the appropriate forum so long as 
dismissal would be in the interests of justice. See, e.g., 
Instrumentation Assoc., Inc. v. Madsen Elec. (Canada) Ltd., 
859 F.2d 4, 6 n.4 (3d Cir. 1988); Central Contracting Co. v. 
Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1966);17 
Moore's Federal Practice, S111.04[4][c] (Matthew Bender 3d 
ed.). It is also clear that where venue would be proper in 
the initial forum court, provided no forum selection clause 
covered the subject matter of the lawsuit, it is inappropriate 
to dismiss pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1406 (allowing dismissal 
based on improper venue). See Jumara, 55 F.3d at 878-79. 
 
In the present case, the forum selection clause specified 
that suit could be brought either in state courts located 
within New York County or in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New Y ork. Lazard has not 
filed a motion for transfer, but rather a motion to dismiss 
based on the forum selection clause. The District Court 
treated this as a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6), but still employed the balancing test of 28 U.S.C. 
S 1404(a) to determine whether dismissal based on the 
forum selection clause was proper. The District Court found 
that dismissal was proper. Salovaara appeals, arguing that 
Lazard's motion should have been construed as a motion 
for transfer because the forum selection clause allowed suit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Under 28 U.S.C. S 1404(a), a district court may transfer a civil case 
to 
another district "[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in 
the 
interest of justice. . . ." Before permitting such a transfer, a district 
court 
also must consider "all relevant factors to determine whether on balance 
the litigation would more conveniently pr oceed and the interests of 
justice be better served by transfer to a dif ferent forum." Jumara, 55 
F.3d at 879 (quoting 1A Pt. 2 Moor e's P 0.345[5], at 4363). 
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to be filed in another federal forum. He notes that dismissal 
is only warranted when the forum selection clause pr events 
filing in any federal court. See 17 Moore's Federal Practice, 
S 111.04[4][c]; Reynolds Publishers, Inc. v. Graphics Fin. 
Group, Ltd., 938 F. Supp. 256, 260-61 (D.N.J. 1996). 
 
We agree that venue was otherwise pr oper in the District 
of New Jersey and that 28 U.S.C. S 1406 would therefore 
not apply. The question is whether the District Court 
properly dismissed the case instead of transferring it to the 
Southern District of New York. In that regard, an 
examination of our decision in Crescent Int'l Inc. v. Avatar 
Communities, Inc., 857 F.3d 943, 944 (3d Cir. 1988), is 
particularly helpful. In Crescent, a Florida corporation, 
Avatar Communities, Inc. ("Avatar"), and a Pennsylvania 
corporation, Crescent International, Inc. ("Crescent"), 
entered into an agreement containing a forum selection 
that required "`any litigation . . . [to] be maintained' in a 
state or federal court in Miami, Florida." 857 F.2d 943, 944 
(3d Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, 
Crescent filed an action in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In r esponse, 
Avatar filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing a 
breach of the forum selection clause. The District Court 
granted Avatar's Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on the forum 
selection clause and we upheld the dismissal.6 See 
Crescent, 857 F.2d at 944-45. 
 
Our holding in Crescent leaves no doubt that a 12(b)(6) 
dismissal is a permissible means of enfor cing a forum 
selection clause that allows suit to be filed in another 
federal forum. The present case involves such a clause and 
accordingly Crescent contr ols. The District Court's sua 
sponte weighing of S 1404's factors does nothing to limit the 
precedential impact of Crescent, where the parties agreed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. There is much disagreement over whether dismissal (where 
appropriate) should be made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 
12(b)(3), or 12(b)(6). See, e.g.,Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1112n.1 
(1st Cir. 1993) (dismissal based on forum selection clause specifying 
state forum grounded on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), not 12(b)(3)); Lipcon v. 
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(collecting cases adopting each rationale and wher e forum selection 
clauses specified non-federal forums). 
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that S 1404 was inapplicable to their case. Indeed, there is 
nothing in Crescent that pr ecludes a district court, faced 
with a Rule 12 motion based on a forum selection clause, 
from considering S 1404 factors to deter mine whether 
transfer is the better course. Moreover , adding S 1404 to the 
mix does nothing to abrogate a district court's authority to 
dismiss under Rule 12. That is, the existence or non- 
existence of a S 1404(a) motion is not pertinent to deciding 
the proper scope of a 12(b)(6) motion. 
 
We acknowledge that, as a general matter , it makes better 
sense, when venue is proper but the parties have agreed 
upon a not-unreasonable forum selection clause that points 
to another federal venue, to transfer rather than dismiss. 
And if a defendant moves under S 1404(a), transfer, of 
course, is the proper vehicle (assuming the r easonableness 
of the forum selection clause). But when a defendant moves 
under Rule 12, a district court retains the judicial power to 
dismiss notwithstanding its consideration of S 1404. As 
such, the District Court's dismissal of Salovaara's claim 
against Lazard was proper. 
 
The District Court's interpretation of Rule 12(b)(6) not 
only comports with our holding in Crescent but is also 
corroborated by authority from other jurisdictions. In 
Security Watch v. Sentinel Sys., Inc., for example, the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed a Rule 12 dismissal based on a forum 
selection clause that specified that litigation only be 
brought "in the . . . Circuit Court for the City of Hampton, 
Virginia, or the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia." 176 F .3d 369, 374 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(emphasis added). Additionally, Ninth Circuit case law has 
been read to allow Rule 12(b)(3) as a means of enforcing 
forum selection clauses that permit suit in state or federal 
courts. See Walker v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 63 F. Supp. 2d 
1083 (N.D. Cal. 1999).7 Similarly, other courts that have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Walker's interpretation ofNinth Circuit precedent (Walker explicitly 
relied on Argueta v. Banco Mexicano, S.A., 87 F.3d 320 (9th Cir. 1996)) 
finds further support in Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 934 F.2d 1091 
(9th Cir. 1991) ("Shute II"), despite Shute's somewhat complicated 
procedural history. The Shute litigation began with a summary judgment 
motion, in which the defendant alleged: (i) that the District Court, in 
the 
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addressed the scope of Rule 12 in this context have 
confirmed the power to dismiss under such circumstances. 
See Rooney v. Biomet, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D. Mass. 
1999) (granting dismissal under Rule 12(b) based on a 
forum selection clause that specified certain state and 
federal courts as acceptable forums); Soil Shield Int'l Inc. v. 
Lilly Indus., Inc., No. C 98-1353, 1998 WL 283580 (N.D. 
Cal. May 29, 1998) (same); Hunter Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Pure 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Western District of Washington, lacked personal jurisdiction; and (ii) 
that 
a forum selection clause permitted suit only in Florida's state or federal 
courts. In the alternative, the defendant r equested that the case be 
transferred to the Southern District of Florida. See Shute v. Carnival 
Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 379 (9th Cir . 1990) ("Shute I"). 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment on personal jurisdiction 
grounds without addressing the forum selection clause, and the Ninth 
Circuit reversed in Shute I. In Shute I, the Court of Appeals held that 
personal jurisdiction was proper, but that, since the forum selection 
clause was unreasonable, that clause was legally unenforceable. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that the forum 
selection clause was reasonable and enfor ceable, though the Court did 
not address whether the proper mechanism for such enforcement was 
summary judgment under Rule 56 or transfer underS 1406(a). See 
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 
On remand, defendant's request for transfer was not discussed; 
instead, the District Court's original decision granting summary 
judgment was simply affirmed. See Shute II, 934 F.2d at 1091. By so 
doing, the Ninth Circuit necessarily, though implicitly, affirmed the 
District Court's authority to grant summary judgment, instead of 
granting transfer, in enforcing a forum selection clause that would have 
allowed litigation to proceed in the Souther n District of Florida. 
Although 
the Shute litigation dealt only with summary judgment motions under 
Rule 56, subsequent decisions have construed the principles contained 
therein as relevant in the context of 12(b) motions as well. See Foster v. 
Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207, 1215 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[N]o one 
doubts the district court's power to dismiss pursuant to a properly 
construed forum selection clause . . . .") (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, 
Inc., 499 U.S. at 585) (dictum); Inter national Software Sys. v. Amplicon, 
Inc., 77 F.3d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The Supreme Court reversed the 
Court of Appeals without reaching the personal jurisdiction issue, in 
effect reinstating the dismissal of the suit based on the forum selection 
clause."). 
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Beverage Partners, 820 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Miss. 1993) 
(same). 
 
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the District 
Court was not required to treat Lazar d's motion for 
dismissal as a motion for transfer simply because the 
forum selection clause specified that suit be br ought in 
either a federal or a state forum. Ther efore, we hold that the 
District Court properly dismissed Salovaara's complaint 
against Lazard. 
 
B. Scope of Coverage of the Forum Selection Clause 
 
With regard to the coverage of the forum selection clause, 
Salovaara argues that it was meant to apply only to 
lawsuits requiring the Funds to indemnify Lazar d if a third 
party made a claim against the South Street Funds and 
Lazard arising out of the sale of securities. Salovaara 
argues that it does not apply to disputes between the South 
Street Funds and Lazard. Salovaara also notes that the 
Agreement does not define the scope of its coverage, and 
that this omission indicates that it was not intended to 
have such a broad construction. 
 
As the District Court noted, the Agreement pr ovided: "In 
connection with our role as your agent in the proposed sale 
of the Bucyrus-Erie Co. Secured Notes, you and we are 
entering into this letter agreement." (App. 186, 190). It 
further provides: 
 
       This agreement and any claim related dir ectly or 
       indirectly to this agreement (including any claim 
       concerning advice provided pursuant to this 
       agreement) shall be governed and construed in 
       accordance with the laws of the State of New Y ork . . . . 
       No such claim shall be commenced, prosecuted or 
       continued in any forum other than the courts of the 
       State of New York located in the City and County of 
       New York or in the United States District Court for the 
       Southern District of New York. 
 
(App. 187-88, 191-92). 
 
It is quite clear to us that this language covers the 
present dispute. As for Salovaara's claim that the alleged 
acts giving rise to the suit took place prior to the formation 
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of this Agreement, the Agreement specifically states that it 
covers any claim related "directly or indirectly" to the sale 
or to advice rendered regarding the sale of the Notes. Since 
this lawsuit involves that subject matter, it is covered by 
the forum selection clause. The District Court thus did not 
err when it found that the forum selection clause of the 
Indemnification Agreement covered the subject matter of 
this lawsuit. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we dismiss the case against 
Jackson National as moot and affirm the or der dismissing 
the cause against Lazard Freres. 
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